A Starter Library on Populism

Josh Allen on 1st June 2020

Matteo Salvini stands at an official Italian government lectern giving a speech. He wears a dark grey suit and lighter grey tie, with a white shirt. He is flanked by two men who are similarly attired with another male figure stood behind them. part of a stone carved statue can be seen behind them alongside several Italian tricolors and an EU flag

By PiAP’s Adrian Favero, Niko Hatakka, Judith Sijstermans, Mattia Zulianello – this piece originally appeared on EA Worldview

We asked each of the Research Fellows on the Populism in Action Project to give us opening recommendations to learn about populism, populist parties, and the future of European politics and society.

This is their Starter’s Library:

Dr. Adrian Favero, Switzerland focused Research Fellow

Nicole Loew and Thorsten Fass (2019) “Between Thin- and Host-ideologies: How Populist Attitudes Interact with Policy Preferences in Shaping Voting Behaviour,” Representation

Loew and Fass, from the Freie Universität Berlin, explores the demand side of left-wing and right-wing populism in Germany. They focus on voters for the Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) and Die Linke (Left Party), applying the ideational approach to populism as a framework for their research.

The study considers the complex interaction between populist attitudes, policy preferences, and voter choice. Loew and Fass build an analysis derived from the literature on host ideologies, such as socialism and nationalism, that influence voting behavior.

In their conclusion, they outline convincingly that on the demand side of politics, populist attitudes and strong policy preferences lead to votes for populist parties on either the left or the right. Yet voters with moderate policy concerns and strong populist attitudes are still more likely to vote for populist parties because these attitudes substitute for policy preferences.

The article sheds light on a group of voters who are less driven by policy preferences than they are motivated by populism itself. If this is true across the nation, populist parties can rely on either policies or populist attitudes as a driver to increase their vote share.

Shelley Boulianne, Karolina Koc-Michalska, and Bruce Bimber (2020) “Right-Wing Populism, Social Media and Echo Chambers in Western Democracies”, New Media & Society

Boulianne, Koc-Michalska, and Bruce Bimber explore the effect of self-exposure to social media–based “echo chambers” on the rise of right-wing populism.

Based on a large-scale survey of 4500 respondents conducted in France, the UK, and the US, the authors assess citizens’ experiences of echo-chamber effects and support for populist parties. The novelty of this strand of research is the study’s comparative approach, which rules out country-specific explanations such as economics and immigration.

The study also assesses the polarizing effect of echo chambers and polarization’s link to left-wing or right-wing ideologies. The authors conclude that exposure to selective information in social media echo chambers does not predict support for right-wing parties as opposed to other parties. However, they find an echo chamber effect in the context of offline discussions with like-minded people, which is associated with support for right-wing populists.

The findings challenge the common assumption that digital echo chambers increase the propensity to endorse right-wing populism.

Laurent Bernhard and Hanspeter Kriesi (2019) “Populism in Election Times: A Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries in Western Europe”, West European Politics

Bernhard and Kriesi, through a content analysis of press releases in 11 countries in Western Europe, offers an interesting comparative analysis of the populist ideology expressed by parties during election campaigns.

They evaluate three types of appeals: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and demands for popular sovereignty. They not only look at populist parties from both the radical right and the radical left, but also at the division of issue dimensions, such as culture and economy, in northern and southern Europe. The article combines quantitative text analysis with qualitative examples, providing the reader with helpful illustrations of the national context.

The authors conclude that mainstream parties are less prone to rely on populist rhetoric. Intriguingly, this challenges the assumption that mainstream parties adjust to populist strategies exhibited by the far left and right. This description of gradual populism among “extreme parties” is important because it highlights the importance of nuanced classification.

A Swiss People’s Party poster in 2016: "Finally Create Security"

A Swiss People’s Party poster in 2016: “Finally Create Security” (Fabrice Coffrini/AFP/Getty Images)

Dr. Niko Hatakka, Finland focused Research Fellow

Salla-Maaria Laaksonen, Mervi Pantti, and Gavan Titley (2020) “Broadcasting the Movement and Branding Political Microcelebrities: Finnish Anti-Immigration Video Practices on YouTube”, Journal of Communication

The authors analyze the usage of YouTube by Finnish anti-immigration movements after 2015.

Despite online platforms having significant effects on the style, contents, and form of populist radical right activism, in and parallel to the Finns Party, specific Finnish online movements have rarely been researched empirically. The study is based on qualitative content analysis of the actors, genres, functions, styles, framings, and strategies employed in YouTube videos affiliated to two separate movements, Rajat Kiinni and Suomen Kansa Ensin. The qualitative analysis is preceded and eloquently informed by a simple, yet effective, network analysis.

The paper highlights the role of microcelebrities as pivotal nodes in the movement’s network. Without explicitly stating the outcome, the authors display and discuss how YouTube’s properties and functions affect the process of empty signifiers uniting hybrid political movements.

Michael Hameleers and Rens Vliegenthart (2020) “The Rise of a Populist Zeitgeist? A Content Analysis of Populist Media Coverage in Newspapers Published between 1990 and 2017”, Journalism Studies

Hameleers and Vliegenhart’s article contributes to the discussion on the mainstreaming of populism as a thin-centered ideology in Western Europe.

Focusing on a 28-year period in the Netherlands, the authors use a dictionary-based approach to analyze the temporal prevalence of populist communication in newspapers. Measuring the number of articles which contain pre-selected words that are indicative of four selected elements of populist communication, the study portrays how people-centric and anti-elitist communication has become more prevalent over time.

The paper is the first attempt to use a word-based automated analysis of populist communication on a longer time scale. Because of its single country focus, it effectively proves an outlet-independent increase in the elements of populist communication measured.

Future studies seeking to pursue this method will have to resolve the problem of being able to use it reliably in a comparative setting. The difficulty of this task raises interesting questions about whether the thin-ideological understanding of the different elements of populism, for example viewing “the people” as the “ordinary people”, corresponds to the reality of how populist mobilizations are enabled by a staggeringly vast array of signifiers.

Jonathan Dean and Bice Maiguascha (2020) “Did Somebody Say Populism? Towards a Renewal and Reorientation of Populism Studies”, Journal of Political Ideologies

The mainstream of populism research is strongly rooted in the ideational approach, which regards populism as a set of ideas or a thin-centered ideology. So it is refreshing to read articles that engage with the “other” approach, the Laclaudian theory of populism.

Dean and Maiguascha critically analyze the strengths and weaknesses of both theoretical approaches and encourage populism scholars to critically evaluate whether their use of the concepts are useful. Specifically they urge scholars to ask whether their selected definition of populism can both feed into anti-populist rhetoric and provide momentum for “populist hype”.

The authors suggest that more scholarly attention should be directed to populism not as a concept but as a signifier that has potential to be more political than analytical, especially outside of academia. A good first step will be a more conscious effort by scholars to recognize and be transparent about the epistemic limits of our definitions and operationalization of “populist ideas”, “populist style”, and “populist logic”.

Referring to only one of these distinct elements comprehensively as “populism” makes little sense and enflames disputes between the different populism research communities. Further work to combine the theoretical aspects of the different sub-disciplines of populism research should be encouraged, and this article is an excellent contribution to such a pursuit.

Finns Party leader Jussi Halla-aho

Dr. Judith Sijstermans, Belgium focused Research Fellow

Léonie de Jonge (2019). “The Populist Radical Right and the Media in the Benelux: Friend or Foe?”, The International Journal of Press/Politics

De Jonge’s work focuses on Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and ties into the case of the Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB), one of four cases being studied by the Populism in Action Project.

Drawing on evocative interviews with media practitioners, de Jonge argues that the media in the Netherlands and Flanders have taken a more accommodating approach to right wing populist parties, in comparison with that of the media in Wallonia and Luxembourg. These approaches are shaped by mass media market dynamics in each country and the nature of their political systems.

De Jonge suggests that differing media responses have shaped the populist parties’ electoral trajectories. This speaks to an interesting dynamic within Belgium, where Flanders and Wallonia differ significantly in terms of populist radical right success. This has been further studied by Hilde Coffé.

It may seem incongruous to include a work so focused on the media in this review. However, in my early interviews with VB representatives, the media has been a pressing issue. The party seeks out support on social media to bypass what they see as a widespread “cordon mediatique” in the Belgian press. De Jonge discusses her work in a podcast (in Dutch).

Menno Fenger (2018). “The Social Policy Agendas of Populist Radical Right Parties in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy

It is a stretch to say, as Fenger does, that “there has been only limited research on the attitudes of these populist radical right parties towards the welfare state”. However, the novelty in this article’s approach is its broad empirical comparison between six populist radical right parties.

The inclusion of Donald Trump as a populist radical right figure is controversial but interesting. Fenger shows a clear gap between the social policies portrayed by Trump and those of his European counterparts, despite “some European leaders highlight[ing] their association with the Trump Administration”. The strategy of adopting Trump’s language has emerged in the Flemish Interest, making it useful to include Trump here, if only to highlight how few substantive similarities exist despite the professed symbolic links.

The article raises more questions than it answers providing a starting point for further research. Why are some parties, as Fenger says, “dogmatic” whilst others are “pragmatic”? Should we include Trump in future analyses? What causes similarities in Dutch and Flemish approaches to social policy? Studies of PRRPs rarely cover such broad ground, and given the comparative aims of our own project, this article is a useful reference point.

Agnes Akkerman, Andrzej Zaslove, and Bram Spruyt (2017). “‘We the People’ or ‘We the Peoples’? A Comparison of Support for the Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left in the Netherlands”, Swiss Political Science Review

The authors of this article compare supporters of a populist radical right and populist radical left party in the Netherlands, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom, PVV) and the Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party, SP) respectively. They test hypotheses on the attitudes that unite and divide these parties’ voters.

Populism in Activism Project co-investigator Stijn van Kessel has suggested that the SP has stepped away from its populist rhetoric. However, studying populism in parties on either side of the ideological spectrum is a useful way to move past preconceived notions about populism. The authors argue that, given their faith in the “people”, “a populist vote may not only be a vote against but also for something”. Both parties’ supporters hold populist attitudes and low levels of trust, but what supporters of each party are voting for differs.

Tying into Fenger’s discussions of social policy, the authors posit a certain symmetry in the welfare policies of PRR and PRL parties, hypothesizing that supporters of both support more social security benefits. However, their findings do not support this.

For those with an interest in this dynamic, other scholars have delved more deeply into the links between economic positions and populist attitudes in voters including in this article by Van Kessel and Steven Van Hauwaert.

Poster of Belgium's Vlaams Belang party: "Thanks Voters!"

Poster of Belgium’s Vlaams Belang party: “Thanks Voters!”

Dr. Mattia Zulianello, Italy focused Research Fellow

Lenka Buštíková and Petra Guasti (2019). “The State as a Firm: Understanding the Autocratic Roots of Technocratic Populism”, East European Politics and Societies

Buštíková and Guasti provide an excellent and intriguing analysis of technocratic populism, a little-studied manifestation of the populist phenomenon. Focusing on the case of Czech Republic since 1989, the authors ground a solid empirical analysis within a valuable theoretical framework, which greatly enhances our understanding of the many populist actors that do not fit the typical left-right categorization.

Technocratic populism is exemplified in the contemporary context by Andrej Babiš’ ANO 2011. This is the leading force in today’s Czech government, and “strategically uses the appeal of technocratic competence and weaponizes numbers to deliver a populist message”, which emerges “at critical junctures as an alternative to the ideology of liberal democratic pluralism”.

The authors argue that the broader appeal of technocratic populism in comparison with economic and nativist forms of populism, as well as its claim to rule in the name of “the people” on the grounds of technical expertise, make it a “sophisticated threat to liberal democracy”. In particular, by combining an emphasis on technocratic expertise with a people-centric message, this form of populism may lead to democratic backsliding by fueling civic apathy and by providing political actors with a master frame to “legitimize” concentrations of power.

Luigi Curini (2019). “The Spatial Determinants of the Prevalence of Anti-Elite Rhetoric Across Parties”, West European Politics

Spatial analyses of political competition are a true political science classic, and this article by Luigi Curini shows the utility and elegance of such approaches to the study of key aspects of contemporary party politics.

Using data from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data, the author conceptualizes anti-elitism “as a non-policy vote-winning strategy” that has “quasi-valence” features, because they can be positively evaluated by a wide pool of voters. In light of such properties, anti-elitism is understood as a strategy that can potentially be used by any political actor with the goal of increasing their electoral appeal.

Curini’s analysis suggests that the decision of political parties to focus on anti-elitism “does not depend entirely on some inner identity; it also depends on the spatial environment in which they compete”. Indeed, this paper reveals that a given party has a higher incentive to resort to anti-elitism if it is “ideologically ‘squeezed’ among adjacent parties”. Most notably, in such a context, focusing on anti-elitism may help a political party differentiate itself from its proximate competitors in the eyes of the electorate.

Sergiu Gherghina and Sorina Soare (2019). “Electoral Performance Beyond Leaders? The Organization of Populist Parties in Post-Communist Europe”, Party Politics

Gherghina and Sorina Soare offer an excellent example of how to study the impact of leadership and organizational features on the electoral performance of populist parties.

Grounded in the qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources, the paper focuses on three cases from post-communist Europe that present considerable differences in terms of their electoral fate: the Bulgaria Without Censorship Party, the Party of Socialists from the Republic of Moldova, and the People’s Party-Dan Diaconescu of Romania.

Rather than treating leadership and organization as a single variable, as it is often the case in the literature, the authors operate a useful and meaningful distinction between the two in their analysis. This approach makes their contribution of interest to comparativists and to scholars of populism.

Most notably, the analysis reveals that personalization and concentration of power in the hands of charismatic leaders is not sufficient to achieve electoral survival. This paper highlights that endogenous factors are important in the decline of populist parties, especially if they do not develop proper organizational structures and rely instead on the personality of their leaders.

How to Study Populism? Here’s a Valuable Starting Point

Josh Allen on 28th May 2020

By Adrian Favero (PiAP’s Switzerland focused Research Fellow)

Populism has become an integral part of our society, not least because of recent political events and elections across the globe. A quick Google search delivers more than 9 million results for the term.

But what is populism, one of the most contested topics in both the public realm and academia? Is it a behavior, an idea, a political approach? Is it new? Has it changed over time?

In 2018, Matthijs Rooduijn offered a way forward in his article, “State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and Less Focus”, published in the European Journal of Political Research.

Rooduijn’s overview of the current literature identifies the challenges in populist research. As populism studies builds upon previous literature to become more and more nuanced in its evaluation of the concept, the article takes us back to the start and walks the reader trough the political and academic history.

Rooduijn starts in 1967, with an explanation of how scholars first identified different types of populism as their research focused on specific geographic areas, rather than comparisons across regions. He continues through the last 20 years with comparative studies focusing on empirical data and populist parties, and with a plethora of monographs providing a more detailed picture. Most scholars agree that populism should be defined as a set of ideas concerning the relationship between a corrupt elite and the “ordinary” people; however, other research strands such as measurement of populism, populist voters, communication by populists, and populists in government have become increasingly important.

Rooduijn establishes that populism research faces two challenges. First, populism should not be conflated with right-wing or left-wing politics. Populism exists on both right and left, but some parties at the far ends of the political spectrum are not populist at all. Challenger parties and Eurosceptic parties are also not necessarily populists.

Rooduijn also argues that populism research should not detach itself from other research areas. It should incorporate theories and concepts from related social science fields of study such as anti-establishment research.

Through his approach, Rooduijn’s invocation of “both more and less focused” research calls for a narrow and clear conceptualization of populism, whilst remaining open-minded and drawing on the research in related areas.

Well-written, clearly structured, and offering further literature for an in-depth examination of the topic, this is a valuable contribution for anyone who is new to the field and interested in populism research.

(Author’s Note: Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove have also outlined a list of contested issues connected to the concept of populism in public and academic discourse.)

Support for Europe’s Leaders During Coronavirus Crisis — But Will It Last?

Josh Allen on 23rd May 2020

Euronews reports on support for European leaders despite high levels of deaths in their countries from Coronavirus.

The article draws on analysis from the Populism in Action Project’s Daniele Albertazzi:

This is the most serious crisis that has hit Europe since the Second World War. It is quite well-known that in times of crisis, people do tend to rally behind the flag and the government of the day.

Governments have been very shrewd and clever in exploiting this and using metaphors that remind people of war-time periods, so the virus has become an enemy that the population has to defeat by pulling together.”

Right now people on the streets are saying that this is not the moment to have a go at the government.

But Albertazzi draws on findings from PiAP, featured in a series on EA WorldView, to consider possible challenges ahead for those in power.

“You can see in countries like Italy, Switzerland, and Finland that there has been a short period of truce between governments and opposition or more radical and more moderate parties,” he says. “As weeks go past, people will start realizing the enormous financial effect of the crisis as more and more stories emerge about the mishandling of the pandemic and the big mistakes that were made by governments.”

Populist parties face their own challenges, after they “seemed to have initially accepted that they needed to tone down their criticisms of governments or their opponents”, if they try to use Coronavirus to assume power.

It is easy to have a go at governments, opponents or the European Union. But there is certainly a risk that populist parties might jump on the bandwagon of criticism too early and misjudge the mood of the public.”

This is a crisis of such huge proportions that we may still be in the stage where the public and business associations want to see more unity rather than division.

At same time, he assesses, “They have to demonstrate that they have remained fundamentally different from what they see as traditional parties.”

“A Right-Wing Government in Italy in the Future”

Josh Allen on 18th May 2020

The Wall Street Journal echoes analysis from the Populism in Action Project with its article, “Italy’s Political Rivals Reignite Feud After Coronavirus Hiatus”.

PiAP’s Dr Daniele Albertazzi summarizes, in an interview with the Journal:

Populist parties are well-placed to exploit what is coming, in Italy and everywhere else.

In a few months, [Prime Minister Giuseppe] Conte will start losing ground. I can’t see how Italy doesn’t end up with a right-wing government in the future.

The Journal evaluates the political shifts in Italy as it comes out of the worst of the Coronavirus pandemic and begins easing stay-at-home restrictions: “The unwieldy governing coalition has been squabbling over the next steps, its disunity raising doubts about its ability to avert an economic depression.”

Read full article….

Video: Populism and Activism in Europe Today

Josh Allen on 11th May 2020

Featuring Daniele Albertazzi (PiAP Principal Investor) and Stijn van Kessel and Scott Lucas (PiAP Co-Investigators) this video discussion, exploring the necessity and rationale of the Populism in Action project originally appeared on EA Worldview

Untamed and Close to Power: How Europe’s Populist Parties Are Navigating Coronavirus

Josh Allen on 5th May 2020

Giorgia Meloni (a white woman in her early 40s) stands in front of a podium. She is wearing a teal coloured jacket and a white blouse. She is flanked by two white middle aged men probably in their 50s both of whom wear suits and ties. An Italian flag and an EU flag hang upright on poles behind them

by Daniele Albertazzi (PiAP Principal Investigator) – this post originally appeared on EA Worldview

Each Research Fellow in our Populism in Action team has written an analysis explaining the impact of the pandemic on the countries covered by our research: Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium.

The team has focused on the strategies adopted by populist parties within these countries either to challenge their governments’ responses to the pandemic or to support them.

Judith Sijstermans on Belgium’s Flemish Interest: Coronavirus Shapes Belgium’s Government and Populist Opposition

Adrian Favero on the Swiss People’s Party: Coronavirus Brings Rare Unity Among Switzerland’s Parties

Mattia Zulianello and Daniele Albertazzi on Italy’s League: Populism and the Collapse of Italy’s Coronavirus Truce

Niko Hatakka on the Finns Party: Coronavirus Aftermath Is Likely to Unite Finland’s Right-Wing Parties

What becomes apparent reading these analyses is the extent to which the parties we study remain fundamentally “other” vis-à-vis their competitors, refusing to “toe the line” for longer than a few weeks, even in times of crisis. Hence any moderation of tones and “rallying behind the flag” caused by the pandemic has in the end been rather short-lived.

The Swiss People’s Party, the League and the Finns Party all initially chose to back the efforts of their governments, as Coronavirus spread through their countries. A member of the power-sharing executive, the Swiss People’s Party turned down the volume, recognizing a yearning for unity among the population and the business community. The Finns Party and the League also refrained from causing major clashes with their opponents. In the Finnish case, the party even tried to rein in their ranks so that they would not take aim at the government’s efforts to contain the epidemic.

According to our research team, these parties’ aspiration to govern is an important factor to be considered in order to understand this behavior (with the exception of the Swiss People’s Party, which is already in government). While these parties still need to be seen to be responsive to their constituents’ needs, they also want to build a reputation for responsibility.

And yet in every country, the truce between populists and the government has been short-lived. Shortly after our analyses were posted, both the Swiss People’s Party and the League started calling for a very speedy end to the lockdowns, criticizing their governments for not acting fast enough. The Swiss People’s Party continues to serve in government while at the same time attacking the classe politique (the political establishment). From the opposition benches, the League is again raising its voice on EU-related issues, as the first details were made public of an agreement that European governments are seeking on a coordinated response.

Populist parties have realistic chances to govern in many European countries. The Swiss People’s Party is a long-standing member of the power-sharing executive, and the League has been involved in government five times during the last 25 years, although it finds itself in opposition right now. Treating them as “challenger parties”, while defining their opponents as “mainstream/established”, has become an anachronism. However, this does not mean that populist parties have been “tamed”, either in their rhetoric or their policy proposals.

Tom Van Grieken, leader of the Belgian right-wing populist party Vlaams Belang

The “New Mainstream”

Watching what is happening in Finland helps us reflect on this situation where populists are increasingly the “new mainstream”, and yet are not compromising on their ideology and communication strategy. The Finns Party was declared unfit to share government responsibilities by potential allies as recently as 2017, as the leader it chose, Jussi Halla-aho, is widely seen as a radical. However, as the country entered lockdown, he told activists and supporters to avoid online confrontation. This has likely contributed to a re-thinking of the strategy of marginalization by the center-right Coalition Party that may well open the door to closer collaboration with the Finns Party in the future, even if the latter is no less radical now than it was in 2017.

The clearest example of a party that was not tempted by the idea of signing a short truce with its country’s government is that of Belgium’s Flemish Interest: the party has never served in government so far due to a strict cordon sanitaire put in place by its opponents, and has not been invited to any of the negotiations around the emergency government addressing the pandemic.

The Flemish Interest has never relented in its attacks against the emergency executive, accusing the government of incompetence and highlighting what it said were the many mistakes that the latter made in handling the crisis. Yet only a year ago it moved closer than ever to joining a government coalition, and the need to transition from opposition to government is explicitly addressed in the most recent book written by the party’s leader: “And Now It is Up to Us”.

While populists are increasingly parties of government, they are not being tamed. The opposite is increasingly the case, as non-populist parties take a leaf out of the populist box of tricks and imitate their more vociferous competitors in countries such as the UK, Austria, France, the Netherlands, and many others.

Populists now have a substantial media presence and increasingly shape the public agenda in contemporary Europe. Expect them to go back to their pre-pandemic noisy selves in a few weeks (if they have not already done so), as the devastating economic and social impact of the lockdowns come to light. Also expect their competitors to keep co-opting their style and ideas as they try to keep up with their populist opponents.

Coronavirus Aftermath Is Likely to Unite Finland’s Right-Wing Parties

Josh Allen on 27th April 2020

By Niko Hatakka (PiAP Finland focused Research Fellow)

Coronavirus and a quest for a role in government have forced the Finns Party (PS) to ease off the gas pedal of its ideology and confrontational style.

However, there is plenty of road ahead to accelerate until the 2023 Parliamentary elections. And the ride is likely to get bumpy.

As in Italy and Switzerland, the public health crisis initially appeared to render traditional political divides irrelevant, at least temporarily.

The Finnish Government has carried out strict measures to control transmission of the virus. Due to the country’s developed health care system, comparably advanced crisis preparedness, and the Finnish people’s compliance with the restrictions, there have been less than 200 deaths. Opposition parties, the private sector, and even brusquely right-wing columnists have mostly expressed approval of the left-wing government’s actions.

Some of the loftier analyses have even rekindled the “spirit of the winter war”, the setting aside of political disputes to face a formidable common enemy in World War II.

Until the start of the pandemic, the environmentally-aware and generally “woke” government, led by five women, provided the Finns Party with the perfect symbol of what the party’s supporters consider wrong with “the elites”. But with the government’s authoritative tackling of the shared biological enemy, the Finns Party’s appeals to rally against the threat of green-leftist “climate hysteria” and “pandering to immigrants” appeared tangential.

Yet any decrease in support during the time of Coronavirus will not be a crisis for the Finns Party.

Remaining Fit For Government

Finnish citizens have rapidly rallied around their charismatic leader, the Social Democrat Prime Minister Sanna Marin. With the Finns Party’s support decreasing about 3% to a level of 20% since the first recorded case of Covid-19 in the country, the Social Democrats have overtaken PS to become the most popular party.

For the Parliamentary elections in 2023, the Finns Party must hang on to their largest-ever support while still being viewed as fit for government. Thus far, the party leadership have incrementally toned down their online communications, and even discouraged unnecessary confrontation that could be interpreted as inability to govern responsibly during a crisis.

There has been plenty of scornful public discussion about the government’s failing to source hospital-grade protective equipment, but Finns Party leader Jussi Halla-aho has been reserved in responding to the handling of the crisis. In the latest issue of the party’s newspaper , Halla-aho showed restraint to the point of reproaching his own ranks: “Responsible opposition should not scoff at mistakes that could have happened to any government or score political points with unfounded promises.”

At the national level, the party is trying to patiently sit out the pandemic while holding to its key issues. Throughout the crisis, the central organization’s communications have mostly refrained from overt populist style in performing the crisis, while remaining consistent in demanding cuts of public spending on immigration, environmental protection, and high culture.

However, the leadership has not been able to contain all online communications that could be viewed as “irresponsible” during a health crisis. For example, one MP founded a Facebook page for disseminating information on Coronavirus, and the online community has been riddled with misinformation and conspiracy theories.

Bridging a Temporary Alliance

After the Finns Party’s new leadership was elected in 2017, the other government parties deemed the PS unfit as a coalition partner. Nothing significant has since changed ideologically or organizationally in the Finns Party, but the centre-right Coalition Party has started to change its line about governmental cooperation.

During the first year of the current government, the Coalition Party and the Finns Party increasingly appear to stand on common ground. The Finnish populist radical right and the Finnish centre-right are in the process of constructing a chain of equivalence, a shared front against the danger from the left.

The ideological glue for this alliance will be provided by the two parties’ shared demand for austerity.
After the imminent threat of the virus wanes and the bill of the crisis has to be paid, it is likely that the “spirit of the winter war” will be but a memory as the two main opposition parties join forces to attack the government for overspending.

As forming a right-wing government is no longer possible without the Finns Party, the inevitable tightening of the two parties’ ranks will make the Finnish center-right more open to nativist and authoritarian ideas. This cooperation will also cement the Finns Party’s ongoing shift to the economic right.

Populism and the Collapse of Italy’s Coronavirus Truce

Josh Allen on 21st April 2020

Giuseppe Conti (5 Star Movement affiliated Prime Minister of Italy since 2018) stands at a lectern midst giving a speech. He is a white male of around fifty years of age, has greying dark hair and a slightly tanned face. He is clean shaven and isn't wearing glasses. He wears a dark blue suit with a white handkerchief in to top pocket. His tie is a similar dark blue colour and his shirt is white. Behind him a figure of a male aide or another politican is visible, he is also wearing a suit, aged between 50 and 60, but is balding with a beard. the wall behind both men is marble and an Italian tricolor is partly visible on a flagpole

By Daniele Albertazzzi (PiAP Principal Investigator) and Mattia Zulianello (PiAP Italy focused Research Fellow) – originally for the UK in a Changing Europe blog

As an indiscriminate, sudden, and exogenous crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic has compelled media and political actors either to quickly adapt their narratives to a new scenario, or to find fresh reasons to reiterate the old tropes they already owned. In Italy, all major political parties have chosen the second option.

Following a brief political truce not dissimilar to that seen in other countries, harsh political competition has made a comeback and parties have embraced their assigned parts in the script written before this crisis struck. These vary according to whether parties support the government or not, and how they need to position themselves vis à vis their political friends and foes.

The truce ended as the first details were made public of the agreement EU governments are reaching on how to respond to the crisis caused by the pandemic. Most striking has been the competition between the populist radical right League, now in opposition after being ejected from the government in the summer, and the populist Five Star Movement, a party that is very difficult to place on the left-right scale due to its eclectic ideology. Five Star is now the dominant party within the executive and governs alongside the center-left, and fervently pro-EU, Democratic Party.

What the League and Five Star have always had in common is that they are both EU-critical in theory, albeit EU-compliant in practice. Given the difficulty of finding a solution to the present crisis acceptable to both northern and southern European governments, and with surveys suggesting roughly the same number of Italians now leaning towards Leave and Remain, the present crisis clearly provides a golden opportunity to attack the EU. However, the two parties are now in a very different place when it comes to exploiting the situation.

Until recently, Matteo Salvini’s League has found it difficult to put forward a coherent narrative about how to deal with the pandemic. For some weeks, the seriousness of the crisis and the high levels of public approval enjoyed by Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte meant that, very unusually, Salvini was struggling to get attention in the national media. The overwhelming of Lombardy, a region run by the League, by the virus also militated against him raising his voice.

As the virus struck, Salvini switched from calls to tighten the borders to a premature request that normality should be restored and economic activities reopened while the virus was still spreading at speed. This was followed by a switchback for the country’s lockdown to be made stricter, less than two weeks later.

But the League was rescued by the bickering between EU finance ministers and governments on how to deal with the crisis. As soon as the idea was mooted that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – an institution long opposed by the party – could be used by countries badly hit by the virus to borrow funds with which to cover medical spending, Salvini ended the truce. Reviving memories of Greece’s subjugation to its creditors from 2010 onwards, the League’s leader argued that “the ESM without conditionality does not exist”, and that accepting money via this route would inevitably lead to establishing “a dictatorship in the name of the virus”. Hence the party called for the Italian Treasury to issue bonds to finance the recovery, arguing these should be fully backed by the European Central Bank.

Five Star’s Dilemma

Salvini’s reaction was predictable. Although the League voted in favor of the Lisbon Treaty when its own government brought it to Parliament in 2008, and was ultimately eager to reach an agreement with the European Commission on Italy’s budget when it returned to government in 2018, it has nevertheless embraced EU-criticism and harsh anti-EU tones in every recent electoral campaign.

This situation presents the Five Star Movement, however, with an insoluble dilemma. The script dictates that it should act as an anti-establishment party. But it lacks the skills and political personnel to do this well, especially when dominating the government.

Having criticized the ESM just as often as the League before gaining power for the first time in 2018, Five Star has voted in the EU Parliament against activating this fund. Yet it is the largest partner in a coalition government that may well draw resources from the mechanism in a few weeks’ time. If a credible argument can be made that the money is really being made available “without conditions”, as EU finance ministers have said, the Democratic Party will push for its employment. Doing so is likely to receive backing from Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, a party keen to be seen as “responsible” right now to differentiate itself from its more radical allies on the right. This would force Five Star to attack Conte, the man it picked as PM back in 2018, while some from the opposition cheer him on.

“Performing crisis” may well be one of the core features of populism. When populists are in government, increasingly common in recent years, they can benefit from pitting “the people” against various enemies and by advocating strong leadership to bring crises “under control”. The dilemma for Five Star is that this cannot be done at the same time as distancing itself from the decisions of the Prime Minister.

So, as the League keeps hammering Five Star with accusations of “betrayal” of the national interest, expect the latter to try — but ultimately fail — to keep one foot in and one foot out of government in weeks to come.

Coronavirus Brings Rare Unity Among Switzerland’s Parties

Josh Allen on 6th April 2020

Passengers have disembarked plane and are moving through an airport termina building. A youn white man aged about 30 in a fluorescent orange suit wearing boots, gloves, a visor and facemask is stood taking people's temperatures as a Covid-19 screening and safety precaution

by Adrian Favero (PiAP Switzerland focused Research Fellow) This post originally appeared on EA Worldview as part of a series of analyses from the Populism in Action Project on the effect of Coronavirus on populism and politics in Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, and Finland.

Switzerland is one of the countries most affected by Coronavirus. While the situation is not as severe as in neighboring Italy, as of April 3 the Swiss had almost 600 fatalities and almost 20,000 confirmed cases.

In mid-March, because of the “rapidly worsening” outbreak, both chambers of Parliament interrupted their session and the Federal Council declared an “extraordinary situation” under the Epidemics Act.

Federal Government in Charge

The Epidemics Act has been in force since January 1, 2016. It distinguishes between three situations, affecting the division of responsibility between the confederation and the cantons.

In a “normal” situation, the cantons are generally in charge to enact measures that can prevent and control transmissible diseases. In a “particular” and especially in an “extraordinary” situation, the Federal Council allocates more responsibilities to itself. It may take measures which it considers indispensable without consultation of Parliament or the cantons.

Using this authority, the Federal Council declared an official state of emergency until April 19.

In a decentralized country such as Switzerland, the federal government’s invocation of extensive and exclusive power may create much controversy. So to what extent has Swiss democracy been infected by Coronavirus?

The answer is: not much so far. The Federal Council has more power but it strictly acts within the limits of the Constitution. Under Article 185, the government may issue ordinances and rulings to counter existing or imminent threats of serious disruption to public order or internal and external security.

Unlike countries such as Hungary and Poland, the situation is not leading to extraordinary changes to the country’s political system and an unprecedented centralization of power. The Federal Council’s authority is temporary. If the so-called emergency decrees last longer than six months, Parliament will have to approve an extension.

What About the Parties?

Political parties in Switzerland may react to Coronavirus by promoting their agendas or by positioning themselves as responsible players. My colleague Judith Sijstermans, in her work on Belgium, has highlighted how the right-wing populist Vlaams Belang has used the crisis as a window of opportunity to advance policy goals and justify key ideological viewpoints.

In Switzerland, the political dynamic is a bit different. On the same day as the declaration of an “extraordinary situation” and state of emergency, all parties issued a joint statement in which they declared that they would “stand united and unreservedly behind the Federal Council”. Quoting the unofficial traditional Swiss motto, “One For All – All For One”, most parties pulled together in resolute unity, unequivocally supporting the government’s measures. The populist Swiss People’s Party SVP is the only party so far which, while supporting the joint statement, denounced “shortcomings in the government’s crisis management” that have to be corrected immediately.

Trust in the Government appears to be widespread at the moment, with the members of the legislative organs deferring to the executive in convening an extraordinary session of Parliament. Some parties avoided issuing public statements, with the Social Democrats welcoming the opportunity to meet to create legal certainty and preserve democracy.

Despite their criticism of the government’s crisis management, the SVP did not seize the opportunity to hold the Federal Council accountable and suggested a later meeting, on condition that the government ends the state of emergency. The party called the extraordinary session “unnecessary and irresponsible”, while accepting the government’s assumption of more power during the “extraordinary situation”.

Most parties are still issuing statements for political life after the crisis. They still have to craft long-term strategies on topics which concern their core ideological stances over the economy, society, and security. Nevertheless, the tone of these messages is relatively moderate and largely free of personal attacks.

One For All – All For One?

So why are the parties more measured in bringing in their own demands, while at the same time supporting the Federal Council’s ordinances and rulings?

First, in the current crisis the population yearns for unity and is rallying behind the political leadership. The Federal Council has delivered so far in its response, and many party representatives, Swiss citizens, business leaders, and analysts attest to its effectiveness.

This has made it easier for parties to agree that now is not the time for fierce political competition but for fostering solidarity and trust in the government. Moreover, politicizing the crisis could be detrimental for parties and would not be appreciated by the public.

Second, four of the five largest parties are represented in government. This grand coalition is working well together, and the parties have no reason to attack individual Councillors. The rather harmonic situation is enhanced by lack of an opposition party which would use the crisis for political gains.

Switzerland has little tradition of parliamentary opposition, and some representatives say it is unbecoming to criticize the government right now. Most parties agree that confidence in authority is the imperative of the hour, and any critique can wait until after the crisis.

Pragmatic solutions have replaced ideological disputes. At least for the time being, populist rhetoric and political attacks have given way to a rare effort to achieve unity and solidarity.

Coronavirus Shapes Belgium’s Government and Populist Opposition

Josh Allen on 30th March 2020

Schuman Metro station in Brussels, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a board telling the security measures.

By Judith Sijstermans (PiAP Belgium focused Research Fellow) – this piece originally appeared on EA Worldview

Amid the Coronavirus pandemic, acting Belgian Prime Minister Sophie Wilmès has formed an emergency government with full powers, including further authority in the emergency.

The minority government received support from nine out of twelve Belgian parties in the federal Chamber of Representatives on Tuesday. Only Flemish nationalist party the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), left wing party the Partij van de Arbeid (PVDA), and the right-wing populist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest, VB) objected.

On the surface, this is a show of unity in the Belgian Government. But a deeper look at the state of play and the VB’s opposition uncovers shaky political ground.

Maneuvers over a Government

Belgium has been without a fully-empowered administration since the May 2019 elections, given their mixed results. These not only exacerbated the difference between the Flemish and Walloon regions of the country, but also repudiated the sitting government and punished its parties, Mouvement Reformateur (MR), Open VLD, and Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V). The vote share of the N-VA, which left the government over disputes about the UN Migration Pact, was significantly reduced.

During negotiations, the outgoing government remained as a caretaker administration. Over the weekend of March 14, with the outbreak of Coronavirus and the need for urgent measures, chatter began about an emergency government. All party leaders, except those of the Vlaams Belang, discussed the possibility.

Until that weekend, government “formateurs”, responsible for negotiating a coalition, were still considering many coalition options. The leading option on the table at the time was a “Vivaldi” administration (because its four components represent the composer’s Four Seasons): Francophone socialists, liberals, and Greens and Flemish socialists, liberals, Greens, and Christian Democrats. However, after a long series of attempted negotiations, the only possible arrangement was to further empower the caretaker government.

Coronavirus and Competence

While the news cycle and politics are consumed with Covid-19, time has not stopped. N-VA leader Bart de Wever forecast, “There won’t be much to argue over the next few months. The question is: how do you prepare for peace?”

Flanders’ populist radical right party Vlaams Belang is not waiting for the end of the crisis to push against the government. And it has backing: in a poll commissioned by Belgian news outlets and released on 14 March, the VB is the clear Flemish winner with 28% of the vote. The N-VA suffers the biggest losses, polling 5% below their May 2019 electoral results.

Because of a cordon sanitaire upheld by all other Belgian parties since 1989, the negotiations to organize an emergency government did not include VB. But in May 2019, the party came the closest in its history to governing at the highest level. There were discussions to form a government with N-VA leader de Wever, and VB leader Tom van Grieken met the Belgian King.

Since autumn 2019, the VB has used the rhetoric of “Mission 2024”, seeking to become the largest Flemish party at the next elections, which would give them the right to be the first party to begin negotiations in Flanders. In their push against the cordon sanitaire and their opposition to the emergency government, Van Grieken wrote an open letter to Wilmès this weekend:

I do not agree with the fact that you, even today, divide citizens into first and second class citizens just because they voted for the “wrong” party. I hope that you withdraw your heartless decision and that the next meeting does involve the country’s second largest party.

Coronavirus provides an opportunity for the Vlaams Belang to project its ability to make policy, to argue that it is ready for the transition from an opposition to a governing party. This is the theme of leader Van Grieken’s new book, released on March 11th, En nu is het aan ons (“And now it is up to us”).

Since the 2019 elections the party has slowly been building up its staff resources. These have focused on policy experts, reflected in a new structure linking staff across the party and Belgium’s different legislative bodies.

In the case of Covid-19, the party has sought best practice and pointed at South Korea and Singapore as examples of good governance. It has criticized Belgium’s acting government and urged more radical measures more quickly. The party proposed a committee to scrutinize the government’s actions to ensure that the “coronavirus does not become a corona-coup”.

Gerolf Annemans, VB MEP and former leader, explained on Twitter:

This is a glorified coup by Magnette [leader of the Parti Socialiste] to push through his Vivaldi construction. Abusing the Corona crisis to try to silence the opposition. One of the most outrageous manoeuvres ever seen. Why, N-VA?

“I Told You So”

Vlaams Belang has used the virus to validate many of its key ideological stances: anti-immigration, law and order policies, and sub-state nationalism. Closing the borders has been celebrated and the party has urged further action, such as placing soldiers at the border. Long-time VB figurehead Filip Dewinter tweeted, when a terror suspect was arrested by border control:

Apparently it takes a Corona crisis to make clear that controlled borders are necessary and useful: we keep out intruders (corona, illegal immigrants, drug dealers…) and the bad guys (terrorists, criminals …) in — behind bars!

The party’s representatives have pointed to the perceived unfair distribution of health care resources between Flanders and Wallonia, criticized China for “causing” the Coronavirus crisis, and pinned unrest on the streets and in stores on young migrants.

The Covid-19 crisis, alongside long-term government deadlock and recent polls, provides a window of opportunity for the VB. The party’s framing of the crisis reflects both long-term policy goals and an accelerating push towards breaking Belgium’s cordon sanitaire.

In the time of Coronavirus, governments around the world have sought to suspend political conflict in the name of unity. But for the VB, pressure on the government remains crucial.