COVID-19 and the Swiss People’s Party: Walking a Fine Line Between Government and Opposition

by Dr. Adrian Favero (University of Birmingham)

Switzerland’s first COVID-19 case was reported on 25th of February 2020 in the Italian-Swiss canton of Ticino. Soon after, the country started recording large numbers of positive cases. On the 16th of March 2020, the Swiss government (Federal Council) declared an “extraordinary situation” under the Epidemics Act. This declaration allowed the government to implement restrictive measures to contain the spread of the virus without needing any immediate approvals from parliament. However, invoking extensive powers created the potential for much controversy amongst regional and national parties.

The populist radical right wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) – which operates nationwide – found itself in a difficult place. Holding two out of seven seats in government, the SVP joined other, non-populist, parties in declaring that they would stand united behind the Federal Council’s position and did not immediately seize the opportunity to hold the Federal Council accountable for its decisions.

However, moving towards a more typical populist standpoint by starting to criticise the “elite”, the SVP changed tack two weeks later and advocated the limitation of state intervention, so as to avoid massive damages to the national economy. Over the coming months, the party increasingly opposed the government’s interventions and promoted its own strategy to contain the pandemic, based on its core ideological co-ordinates. These included: strict border controls, the principle of self-reliance, and the protection of the Swiss economy. The party also used the Covid-19 crisis to push its initiative to reduce the number of new migrants from the EU, which was ultimately rejected by Swiss voters in autumn 2020.

After a relatively calm summer characterised by a drop in the number of cases, Switzerland experienced a rise in COVID-19 cases throughout the autumn of 2020. The SVP continued to criticise the Federal government’s measures on the grounds of their alleged negative effect on the national economy and on the well-being of Swiss citizens. The party also repeatedly demanded an immediate end to the “lockdown” during early 2021. Despite having two representatives in government, as mentioned, the SVP singled out the Federal Minister of Health – a Social Democrat –  as the target of harsh criticism of the executive’s measures, going so far as accusing the government of becoming a dictatorship.

On the 13th of June 2021,the Swiss electorate approved the COVID-19 Act via a national referendum (the “Yes” vote reaching 60.2%). The Act grants the Federal Council additional powers to combat the pandemic and mitigate its negative effects on society and the economy. In contrast to all other parties represented in government, the SVP did not take an official position on the vote. This reflected the party’s divisions, as it was split between those welcoming the financial help provided by the government and those particularly critical of its handling of the pandemic.

During the summer of 2021, the SVP advocated “return to normalcy”. With lower case numbers and the vaccine available to all, the party opposed the extension of “COVID-19 passes” to everyday activities, and making vaccination compulsory. In this fashion, the SVP still walks a very fine line between being in government and performing the role of an opposition — despite the consociational logic of the Swiss system requiring collaboration between main parties that share government responsibilities.

Dr. Adrian Favero is the Populism in Action Project’s Switzerland focused Research Fellow. You can follow him on Twitter here. 

Daniele Albertazzi Quoted in Italy’s Domani

Populism in Action’s Principal Investigator Prof. Daniele Albertazzi was quoted in Italy’s Domani newspaper on 22/10/21 in a news feature written by Davide Maria de Luca.

In the article entitled “Theatre of Quarrels on the Centre-Right” Prof. Albertazzi explains that:

…with highly compatible electorates and ideologies- the Italian right will reunite when it matters at the polls. Not least because every right-wing government led by Berlusconi in the past, was characterised by constant in-fighting between the parties making up the coalition, but this never stopped them from coming back together before the subsequent election.

Read the full article (in Italian) here.

 

How do populists respond to growing insecurities?

by Donatella Bonansinga (University of Birmingham)

Academic and media debates usually portray right-wing populists as distinctively relying on narratives of insecurity and the construction of popular fear. We tend to hear about the relationship between populism, insecurity and emotions as one of manipulation. For many, populists (but what is meant here is usually: ‘right-wing populists’) ‘distort’ reality by representing ‘outsiders’ as existential threats to the people, hence fuelling fears and hostility against them.

In my recent research, I argue that thinking about the relationship between populism, insecurity and emotions in this one-dimensional way is not sufficient to understand the complex socio-political phenomena underlying the appeal of populism. Indeed, this line of reasoning often relies on incorrect assumptions.

Firstly, we tend to equate populists ‘speaking security’ with discourses around crime or law and order, however this is arguably an oversimplification. The risk is that — despite acknowledging that insecurities and grievances play a role in the success of different populisms – we end up overlooking how the populist left also engages in this kind of discourse, while not necessarily focusing on law and order per se. Secondly, we tend to think of populism as a negative phenomenon, ‘exploiting’ people’s deepest fears and clouding ‘rational thinking’. On the contrary – and just like any other political phenomenon – populism can elicit an array of emotional reactions, including positive ones.

To analyse this topic, I examined speeches by Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon during the last French presidential election campaign in 2017. Marine Le Pen is the leader of Rassemblement National (formerly, Front National), a prototypical example of a European populist radical right party. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, by contrast, is the founder and leader of La France Insoumise, a prototypical example of a populist radical left party. France represents an insightful laboratory for populism research because of these two competing populisms.

What is insecurity?

Le Pen and Mélenchon both conceive of insecurity in numerous ways linked to notions of danger, uncertainty, anxiety and the need to ‘protect the people’ from various harms. Crucially however, their ideology informs their identification of insecurity sources. For Marine Le Pen, ideas of physical violence (like crime and terrorism) or cultural threats (like multiculturalism and immigration) are the most salient. However, for Mélenchon it is climate change, international security and neoliberalism that matter as ‘threats’. Both actors overlap in identifying the EU as an ‘accelerator’, or the actor, ‘ultimately responsible’ for this ‘exploding insecurity’.

Insecurity beyond fear

In my work I captured the latent emotional fabric of contemporary French populism’s insecurity discourse by mapping implicit emotional appeals. This means capturing the extent to which a political message taps into the ‘cues’ that research has shown can arouse specific emotional reactions. These are also known as core relational themes. I have found that both Le Pen’s and Mélenchon’s insecurity narratives weave a ‘story of insecurity’ centred on the fact that some threats should be feared, some enemies deserve getting angry at, in-groups should make us proud and there are solutions we can hope for.

Populist emotional governance

Through appeals to fear, anger, pride and hope, Le Pen and Mélenchon arguably perform ‘emotional governance’, meaning that they help guide and regulate public emotions on a number of issues.

Fear appeals appeared right at the start of Le Pen’s and Mélenchon’s narratives, setting the stage for what should be understood as a source of insecurity. Contemporary insecurity is a complex and blurry phenomenon, hence fear appeals constitute important interpretative cues guiding what citizens come to see as threats and dangers.

After introducing the source of insecurity, Le Pen and Mélenchon immediately shift attention to a key element of the insecurity story: the unfair character of this danger and the dismissive, negligent or even irresponsible behaviour of the elites in power, causing insecurities. These themes are central elicitors of anger and provide an interpretation of insecurity as the product of intentional and malevolent elites’ behaviour.

The narration of an unfair insecure existence is then juxtaposed to positive, celebratory remarks praising ‘the people’. Acknowledging positive qualities, strengths and achievements lies at the core of pride arousal. By highlighting the people’s positive traits and worth, both Le Pen and Mélenchon are likely to elicit pride in their audiences, re-energising them, in a call to avoid resignation.

Finally, these actors seize the ‘insecure present’ by proposing actions to address insecurity in the ‘future’. In emotional terms, this means grounding insecurity narratives in appeals to hope. After telling their audience what is wrong with society and who is responsible for generating pervasive insecurity, Le Pen and Mélenchon offer a positive outlook towards the future grounded in the reassurance of security attainment (for Mélenchon) and restoration (for Le Pen).

Where do we go from here?

Contemporary insecurity is a complex phenomenon that is not necessarily immediately intelligible. As I argue in my research, identifying the emotional content of populist insecurity communication is vital. It helps us understand how populists can shape people’s understanding of this complexity, by focusing on specific interpretative cues. It also allows us to explore how populists address and respond to the wide range of insecurities usually linked to their appeal.

Donatella Bonansinga is the Populism in Action Project’s Research Assistant and a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. You can follow her on Twitter here.