October 2020 – Populism in Action

Has Coronavirus Taken The Shine Off Italy’s Prime Minister Conte?

Josh Allen on 31st October 2020

Giuseppe Conti (5 Star Movement affiliated Prime Minister of Italy since 2018) stands at a lectern midst giving a speech. He is a white male of around fifty years of age, has greying dark hair and a slightly tanned face. He is clean shaven and isn't wearing glasses. He wears a dark blue suit with a white handkerchief in to top pocket. His tie is a similar dark blue colour and his shirt is white. Behind him a figure of a male aide or another politican is visible, he is also wearing a suit, aged between 50 and 60, but is balding with a beard. the wall behind both men is marble and an Italian tricolor is partly visible on a flagpole

Defying a series of domestic crises and an unstable governing coalition in Italy, Giuseppe Conte (pictured) could become one of the country’s top 10 longest-serving Prime Ministers after 1945.

He has won credit from analysts, and from many Italians, for an honest and straightforward approach to the Coronavirus pandemic that has killed more than 38,000 in the country.

But now Conte may become a political victim of the crisis.

In a Financial Times overview, the Populism in Action Project’s Dr. Daniele Albertazzi explains that Conte, a law professor, benefitted from the combination of competence and his status as an outsider among career politicians.

“Like many other leaders in Europe, Conte has enjoyed [an] increase in popularity, but he has also played it well. He has grown and he has surprised people,” Albertazzi says.

However, PiAP’s principal investigator continues, “But this time is different to February or March. The economy is going to be hit very badly, and people are getting very tired of restrictions.”

He cautions that Conte’s popularity is likely to take a battering in weeks to come.

We saw this with [economist and former Prime Minister] Mario Monti. People who come in from outside of politics are always quite attractive at the start, as Italians loathe the political classes. But then people quickly get sick of them as well.

Populism in Europe and the USA – Webinar Recording

Josh Allen on 28th October 2020

Screengrab of panelists for the 22nd October event. Six middle aged white people arranged in a grid on a video call. Five of the six are men one is a woman

This Webinar took place on October 22, 2020. The main focus of the discussion was how do we understand populist leadership in the US? Is Trump a “populist”? What are the similarities and differences between Trump’s rhetoric and ideology and populists in Europe today (including the UK and Ireland)?

Watch the full webinar here.

Speakers included:

Mick Fealty, Editor of Slugger O’Toole
Dr. Daniele Albertazzi, University of Birmingham
Professor Scott Lucas, University of Birmingham
Professor Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading
Professor Tim Bale, Queen Mary, University of London

The discussion was chaired by Professor Liam Kennedy, Director of UCD Clinton Institute.

PiAP-Clinton Institute Webinar: Comparing Populisms

Josh Allen on 21st October 2020

Close up of two darkly coloured microphones on a wooden podium. They are looking out into a darkened auditorium, where a projector is just about visible. the primary light source in the space is shining on the podium so that is illuminated whereas the rest of the auditorium is dark

This post appeared originally on EA Worldview

What can we learn from examining populism across as well as within countries?

The Populism in Action Project’s Dr. Daniele Albertazzi (University of Birmingham) and Dr. Stijn van Kessel (Queen Mary, University of London), joined by Dr. Julien Mercille (University College Dublin), took on the question in a webinar hosted by UCD’s Clinton Institute on October 15.

A video of this event was recorded and can be accessed here.

Dr. van Kessel laid the foundation for the session by setting out PiAP’s methodology and research questions. He began with the assumption, possibly borne out by the experience and practice of “mainstream” parties over the last 50 years, of a move away from the cultivation of extensive and intensive engagement with a mass membership. PiAP’s critique of this model is the demonstration of a mixture of older and newer forms of engagement cultivated and sustained by populist radical right parties in Europe.

Dr. Albertazzi then set out some of PiAP’s key findings so far in Belgium (Flanders), Finland, Italy, and Switzerland, considering the cases of Vlaams Belang, the Finns Party, the League and the Swiss People’s Party respectively.

In each, the representatives interviewed were enthusiastic about building local parties as a key part of strategy and internal culture. While there are noticeable local differences — for instance, the prominence of social media and instant messaging channels like WhatsApp in Italy and Belgium, and the relatively high degree of local autonomy enjoyed by branches of the Swiss People’s Party — each party under study is very good at building participatory organizations with which members want to be involved.

Albertazzi explained the attractive proposition of joining a space where a member can connect with like-minded people to share and discuss political ideas. Aware of this, populist radical right parties have developed effective means to mobilize members, who connect with them via social media or through other channels, into face-to-face activity through formal campaigning activity or social events.

Dr. Mercille complemented PiAP’s work, with the discussion of contemporary Irish politics. He explained why, despite the similarities between Ireland and other Western European countries, a populist radical right party has yet to emerge in the Republic.

There are conditions such as increasing economic insecurity, highly visible wealth inequality, concerns amongst culturally conservative individuals about social change, and a lack of trust in the political system. But Mercille suggested that reasons for the non-emergence of a radical right populist party range from the lack of a charismatic leader to the historic right-leaning duopoly of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, dominant since Irish independence in 1921. If there is a breakdown of this historic alignment, then Ireland might join other European countries with a populist radical right party like those studied by PiAP.

Daniele Albertazzi Quoted in Politico EU Article

Josh Allen on 12th October 2020

Populism in Action’s Principal Investigator Daniele Albertazzi provided expert insight and analysis for the Politico EU article “Italy’s 5Stars wage war on themselves” (08/10/2020).

This news feature piece by Rome based correspondent Hannah Roberts interviews activists in the Five Star Movement to get a sense of the ongoing controversy within the party over how Davide Casaleggio, the son of Five Stars’ co-founder Gianroberto Casaleggio, is making use of the position and power he has inherited within the movement following the death of his father.

As the person who ultimately controls the party’s online decision making platform “Rousseau”, Casaleggio has extraordinary personal power, including over electoral candidate lists and internal votes, the rebels say. He also holds members’ personal data, including on how they have voted. Controversy as to how he is using this power has led a number of MPs and other elected representatives to quit the party, and prompted protests by activists and supporters at all levels of the organisation.

Commenting on the ongoing controversy in the movement Daniele Albertazzi reflects that this is a:

Defining movement [for the Five Star Movement]. A party cannot be managed by a private company. When they were setting up and growing it was easy to rely on a private company and the only way to achieve what they did in such a short time.

Now support is shrinking, they need to make some decisions about where they are going and who is going to take them there.

Vlaams Belang’s Populists Seek Lead of Belgium’s “Flemish Front”

Josh Allen on 8th October 2020

by Judith Sijstermans (PiAP Belgium [Flanders] focused Research Fellow – this post originally appeared on EA Worldview

Last week leaders from seven of Belgium’s political parties burned the midnight oil to confirm a governing coalition, almost 500 days after the country’s last election.

That election yielded polarized results in which French-speaking Wallonia voted left and Flanders voted right-wing and separatist. The final coalition, bridging that divide, brings together Flemish and Walloon liberals, socialists, Greens, and the Flemish Christian Democrats.

However, it isn’t only coalition talks that kept Belgium’s mainstream party leaders awake at night. Opposition to the new government has begun to ramp up and has been particularly fervent from Flanders’ populist radical right and independentist party, the Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest).

The party depicts the new governing coalition as unrepresentative of Flanders and its right-leaning electorate, given that the government has a Flemish minority and excludes Flanders’ two largest parties: the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and the VB.

The VB amassed large crowds on September 27 in a “protest drive” with cars full of supporters driving to Brussels from Flemish provinces. The event rounded off a week of action, including a blockade of a key Brussels street. This earlier event was led by VB representatives and saw MEP and former leader Gerolf Annemans detained by police.

The week of action displayed the VB’s ability to activate not only party members but informal party supporters. VB leaders at the rally emphasized their calls for a united “Flemish front” against the government. By doing so, they are leveraging their mobilization of supporters for a stronger position against both the governing political parties and their closest Flemish competitor, the N-VA.

MOBILIZING MEMBERS AND THE MASSES

By mobilizing a reported 15,000 supporters at the “protest drive”, the VB demonstrates that it can meet challenges which have affected political parties generally and the VB specifically.

The VB was reported in 2018 to have just over 18,000 members. This was considerably less than most Belgian parties, but it was a small increase over 2013, while mainstream Belgian parties’ memberships continued to fall.

Amid a series of significant electoral swings since 2000, the VB must seek ways to connect with and hold onto informal new supporters. To this end, it has become social media savvy, building up almost 600,000 likes on Facebook (200,000 more than the N-VA).

Party representatives and organizers note that the majority of party communications occur on social media, targeted at this wider audience rather than solely members. At the September 27 rally, VB leader Tom van Grieken emphasized the party’s wider audience: “This meeting is already larger than just a meeting of the Vlaams Belang. You can feel it. This is growing into a movement.”

Supporter mobilization is sometimes hindered by the overall societal decline of organizational membership and the division between online and in-person activism. In interviews, party representatives reported that getting supporters out from behind computer and mobile phone screens was a challenge, with a reduction in local events, in part because members could easily access information online. Others explained that young VB voters, whose support aided the party’s 2019 election success, were not engaging with the party through in-person campaign activities. So, as well as expanding its online presence, the VB is seeking to support local structures by establishing branches in municipalities currently without one, and providing these branches with mentorship by MPs, and allowing them to maintain all local membership money.

The September 27 rally exemplifies the VB’s two-pronged approach of developing local structures and social media. The event was promoted on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, with professionally-produced videos featuring figures like van Grieken. Through these online platforms, organizers encouraged attendees to add the party’s phone number on Whatsapp which then directed participants to local meeting points. By transitioning social media to more personal communication, the party mobilized informal supporters. In a local context, organizers could connect with supporters personally rather than only coming together in anonymity in Brussels. The national party maintained centralized control of the process and a national message with the hashtag #NietMijnRegering (Not My Government).

LEVERAGING MASS MOBILIZATION

The Vlaams Belang’s mobilization, in opposition of the new government, was not aimed only at those 15,000 attendees or at the coalition parties. A demonstration targeting the new government was also trying to attract voters from the N-VA.

Van Grieken publicly invited high-profile N-VA MP Theo Francken to give a speech at the rally. Francken responded with measured support:

I respect everyone’s way of protesting against a government without democratic legitimacy in Flanders. I’ll keep my firepower for next week’s debate in the Chamber….Good luck.

However, N-VA leader Bart De Wever said of a possible coalition with the Vlaams Belang, “It is not exactly an attractive prospect, because you are dealing with an extreme right-wing party that is not immediately trying to moderate itself.”

At the rally, the VB explicitly appealed to members of other parties to join a “Flemish front”. MP Dries van Langenhoven noted, “Welcome to all loyal militants….But also welcome to everyone who comes out on the street for the first time, to the many N-VA supporters and Open Vld and CD&V supporters present here, it is nice to see that the Flemish front forms when the need is great.”

Van Grieken also called for support from, and simultaneously criticized, N-VA leader De Wever:

Let’s bury the hatchet. Change can only happen if Flemish people work together….

We are not without fault either, but scolding Vlaams Belangers will not help anyone. You have compared us to turds lying in front of someone’s door. I was called a buffoon… Dear Bart, in this way, we are not going to get there.

These overtures to the N-VA and to N-VA supporters position the VB, rather than its larger and more mainstream competitor, as the leader of the Flemish Front. It also hints at the mobilization of action by the VB, not the N-VA, in advance of the government’s formation.

These overtures to the N-VA and appeals to N-VA supporters position the VB, rather than its larger and more mainstream competitor, as the leaders of the Flemish Front. On 27 September, the VB put its strategies of local organizing and social media to the test. The success of the rally provides an indication of how the VB, not the N-VA, are able to mobilize action from Flemish nationalist and right wing voters.

Despite the ostensible focus on opposing the new government, the VB leveraged its ability to mobilize supporters to make a bolder claim: staking the VB’s place as the leading voice of Flemish nationalism.

Italy Focused Research Fellow Mattia Zulianello Writes a Feature for Domani

Josh Allen on 5th October 2020

PiAP’s Italy focused Research Fellow Dr. Mattia Zulianello has had a feature article published in Domani a recently created broadsheet style newspaper focused on longform journalism and expert analysis.

In the piece entitled This is Why the pandemics Have Not Killed Populism, the key points he makes based upon his research are:

Most European populist parties had a negative trend in their voting intentions in the first phase of the pandemic (until the end June). However, despite some notable exceptions, the decline in polls has been rather limited, and is far from being a debacle. More generally, various parties actually gained votes by the summer.

Governing parties in Europe, both populist and non-populist, tended to benefit from the rally-round-the-flag effect. In particular, right-wing populists in government in Europe have seen substantial growth in voting intentions when adopting the most stringent measures to contain the spread of the virus.