Radical Dawa Changing: The Rise of Islamic Neo-Radicalism in the Netherlands

Special thanks to the Islam in Europe Blog for providing this translation.

The Dutch intelligence service AIVD recently released a report on the development of Islamic neo-radicalism titled “Radical Dawa Changing, The Rise of Islamic Neo-Radicalism in the Netherlands” (Radicale dawa in verandering: De opkomst van islamitisch neoradicalisme in Nederland.). This report follows two previous reports by AIVD, one on the general situation of radicalism in the Netherlands and one specifically on jihadi groups. This is a partial summary:

The phases of Muslim radicalism

Muslim radicalism in the Netherlands has gone through a couple of stages and seems to be now starting off a new phase, which the AIVD calls neo-radicalism. These phases do not cancel each other out and there are still active members of each.

The first phase started off in 1980s, when both foreign jihadi and radical dawa organizations set up shop. Their goal group was the first generation immigrants, especially the Moroccans and they were generally very much connected to Saudi Arabia. The ties between the jihadis and dawa people were quite strong at this stage.

The second stage started with the 9/11 attacks, when foreign organizations were banned or dismantled due to the War on Terrorism. The Dutch groups became more autonomous, also because their followers broke away from their original inspiration and became convinced that Islam was oppressed and threatened in the Netherlands. Radical groups grew, but were also fragmented and amateurish. Youth got radicalized on their own, through the internet, a tool which grew very fast in this period. There were dozens of radical Islamic sites in Dutch alone. The ’coolness’ of the ’radical lifestyle’ attracted people who were not ’true’ radicals.

In addition, there were other groups that used Islam to excuse nihilism, escapism, vandalism and criminality.

The 9/11 attacks and the Murder of Theo van Gogh and the political discussion that ensued forced the dawa groups to come out against violence and to distance themselves from the Jihadi groups. The Jihadis, on their side, saw the dawa movements as ’giving in’ to the infidels. The dawa groups did not call for going on jihad abroad, but did not condemn it either.

In this second stage, radical preachers appeared who were more involved with the local state of affairs.

Now a third stage is apparently starting, with new Muslim radicals coming up on the scene and questioning the way things had been done in the past. These radicals want to work in a more organized manner and they reject the individualization of the past, where everybody did whatever they wanted. Their main goal is to slowly build up a broad base for radical Islam and with that build up their movement. In order to build a powerful movement they do not turn only to those who feel alienated and frustrated but to other groups as well, and to each they come with an appropriate message.

The internet is now the most widely used tool, as well as charismatic preachers. However, these groups are still very much fragmented and do not come with a unified dawa message.

They reject terroristic violence, as that will hurt their long term goals, but they do not rule out, for example, street violence without loss of life.

Other groups

When turning the general Muslim population they face competition from groups that call for combining strict adherence to Islam with taking part in Western society (eg. Egyptian TV preacher Amr Khaled). Groups elsewhere in Europe also affect Dutch Muslims. These groups include those striving to publicly express Muslim identity (eg. Tariq Ramadan) and for political emancipation (local Muslim parties taking part in elections).

Other competition are Muslim groups who are secularly oriented and the ex-Muslim associations. There are also groups who reject Western society but do not attempt to change it.

The radical dawa groups set themselves up as the representatives of true Islam. Muslim interest groups led by such radicals are then approached to solve problems in the Muslim community, even if they do not really have many followers. Muslims who do not support them fear coming out against them openly as they are then labeled infidels and enemies of the Muslim community.

The dawa groups deal with the competition in two ways. Through “intolerant isolationism” which means building up spaces of Muslim enclaves (both physical and in the media/internet and education) run by the laws of Sharia. A second method is “anti-democratic Muslim activism”, which aims to remove the ’reprehensible’ democratic order from the public sphere.

Though the radical groups reject terrorist violence, they are checking out other public and secret undemocratic and democracy-hindering tactics. These tactics have been used by radical Muslim groups in Muslim countries for quite some time. Some of these tactics have already been practiced in the Netherlands on a small scale, such as intimidating people in the Muslim community not to take part in the democratic society and to show loyalty to Islam. Some tactics have been considered such as taking over political organization, disturbing social harmony by spreading conspiracy theories and false rumors or setting up their own law system in their neighborhoods through intimidation.

Radical dawa in the Netherlands is led by political Salafists, but there are other active movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat and Muslim Brothers.

The estimates of the AIVD and other intelligence services is that about 5% of religiously oriented Muslims are susceptible to radicalism, and of those 10% actually radicalize and then they tend to go for the jihadi movements. The dawa groups aim for the original 5%.

The report then goes into a more in-depth analysis of the history of both Salafist and non-Salafist groups in the Netherlands. I might summarize this in the future, depending on if there’s interest in it.

Security risks

What kind of security risks do these groups pose?

The AIVD explains that a democratic order is built in two dimensions. The first is the vertical dimension (citizen-government) meaning a democratic constitutional state that includes things such as the separation of powers and freedom of opinion and religion. The second dimension is the horizontal dimension (citizen-citizen) meaning a public society that includes social cohesion, stability, active citizenship and respect for plurality.

The Dutch government sees security in the broad sense, not only to provide physical security but to also provide social trust, a social atmosphere in which citizens can live together peacefully, regardless of religious, ethic or political differences.

In characterizing the risks there are two issues: the good functioning (even to some citizens) and the continued existence of the democratic order.

Do the radical groups have the power to effect such changes, and what opposition do they face?

The radical dawa groups do not currently threaten to topple the democratic order, but it is legitimate to say that they currently pose a risk to the system’s functioning for some citizens, especially Muslims who do not adhere to the Salafist philosophy.

The risk of adverse affects are as follows:

(a) contributing to undermining support for a democratic order by some Muslims (especially pertaining to the horizontal dimension)

(b) contributing to the polarization of society by preaching against homos, Jews, Shiites, secular Muslims and the ’enemies of Islam’ (ie, most of Dutch society)??

(c) preventing Muslims who think otherwise from exercising civil rights – by calling them apostates either directly or indirectly. A website of the as-Soenah mosque, for example, called Ehasan Jami an incestuous weasel who is furious at Islam for not allowing him sexual contact with his mother and sisters.

(d) preventing non-Muslims from exercising civil rights – by using a very intimidating and threatening tone against those considered “enemies” of Islam.

(e) preventing women from exercising civil rights – by preaching for protecting and even saving women’s honor and for limiting women’s activities, and by practicing that in their own circles.

(f) preventing homosexuals from exercising civil rights

(g) enforcing their own legal system in an informal and secret manner – for example, trying to enforce Sharia personal law. For example, some Salafist mosques have contracted Muslim marriages without registering them. This can also lead to practical legitimizing of polygamy.

(h) checking out ways of secretly opposing and upsetting the democratic order – for example, by saying Muslims in the 2006 elementary elections may exceptionally vote, for specific people, in order to thwart the ’enemies of Islam’.

(i) secretly influencing government policy and entering the social middle field – for example, dawa organizations are active in advising municipalities on how to fight crime and dropouts among immigrant youth, or guiding immigrant women. In some cases organizations (secretly) related to Salafist mosques got government subsidies for guiding criminal youth back to society. The aim of the government was achieved in the sense that these youth left crime and improved their school scores, etc, but they also took on an anti-democratic Salafist way of thinking. Radical dawa organizations pose as the representatives of the Muslim community and try to control contact between the authorities and the community. Another such influencing was seen in the case of a Tilbug female teacher who was fired for not willing to shake hands. The woman was ’sent’ by the Tilburg Salafist mosque, which can be seen here trying to introduce ultra-orthodox Islamic rules

(j) breeding ground for radicalizing to violence – for practical reasons, radical dawa rejects violence in the West, but it is not possible to make a clear distinction between jihad and radical dawa, especially not for the individual:

– Radical dawa has an intolerant, isolationist, anti-democratic and anti-Western message that can lead to violence.

– Dutch Muslim terrorists regularly visited Salafist mosques, though they were radicalized further in other ways.

– Radical dawa repeatedly claims that the West is attacking Islam, which leads to see the West as an enemy.

– They reject violence now, but it’s unclear how that would continue if tensions rise, for example by violence against Muslims or a terror attack, since they do justify violence.

– It’s unclear how much the rejection of violence is not done out of pragmatic reasons. Much like in Muslim countries, radical dawa organizations may have splinter groups who do openly support violence.

The continued growth of dawa groups

The continued growth of radical dawa depend on the following:

(a) the continuation of professionalizing and whether they would manage to prevent breaking up due to ideological, ethnic and personal differences. The important questions are who will lead the movements, what their status will be within the Muslim community and how much charisma they would have.

(b) opposition in the Muslim community – though moderate Muslims have trouble today voicing their opposition, opposition may grow by people who realize the radical dawa message is asking too much sacrifice and does not make life better. Leaders who do not follow their preachings might also bring about opposition.

(c) internalizing the radical dawa doctrine

(d) availability of competing non-radical doctrines

(e) polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims – the more conflict, the more both groups are likely to “toe the line” and support the ’group interest’.

(f) expansion of the radical dawa community – will youth attracted to radicalism continue on with it in adulthood and will there be a second generation that grows up with the radical dogma.

Possible risk-developments

Possible developments for risks on the long term: the radical dawa organizations currently have an adverse effect especially on Muslims who think differently. However, they do pose a danger to the democratic order.

In the vertical dimension, they can bring about a growing number of Muslims who do not follow the authority of the Dutch government. An ’ethnic counter-response’ might also be dangerous to the democratic order. In the horizontal dimension, inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations may worsen due to the activities of groups and the reactions to it. The cohesion and solidarity of society can lead to growing suspicions between parts of society and even to violence between Muslims and non-Muslims.


Strategies against Islamic neo-radicalism:

As long as dawa groups do not incite to violence, they are protected by freedom of religion and expression. this causes the democratic paradox – using democratic means to bring about the fall of democracy. However, the democratic order is more than ’majority rule’ and also includes inalienable civil rights. From this point of view, democracy can protect itself. The European Court of Human Rights has already decided that governments may act against group who use democratic means to undermine democracy, if there’s an acute threat.

Judicial action against non-violent intolerant and anti-democratic groups has been done in the Netherlands only in extreme cases and it is generally seen as better to use non-judicial means.

Isolationism in itself does not threaten the democratic order, but intolerant isolationism does pose a threat. This means: exclusivity (discrimination and incitement) and parallelism (having your own laws above state laws). The authorities can work against exclusivity and paralleism, but the dawa organizations spread it sneakily and secretly and the current preaching is protected by civil rights.

The governments policy focuses on prevention and repression. Repression means preventing the growth of dawa organizations by preventing subsidies etc. It is generally agreed that this can be effective if it’s used in a restricted manner, as otherwise it brings about feelings of discrimination and encourages radicalization.

The security threat of Muslim radicalism has gone through both absolutism and relativism. Until recently headlines of Muslim radicalization were seen as a stage in the emancipation of Dutch Muslims. Now such headlines are seen as an immediate threat from all Muslims. This absolutism was caused both by Muslim propaganda, but also by Dutch politicians and leaders who spread doomsday scenarios. Both Muslims and non-Muslims have less trust in the government, with each side feeling that the authorities are not doing enough against the other side (Islamic radical, or anti-Islamists).

Conditions for effective strategies against neo-radicalism:

(a) keep things in proportion – do not subordinate the democratic order to the effectiveness of the approach.

(b) keep in mind the diversity of the Muslim community – see Muslims as individuals and citizens, pay attention to other movements in Islam, realize that about 1/3 to 1/2 of Muslims in the Netherlands do not act from a religious agenda.

(c) prevent polarization by developing government policy – Differentiate between ’hard core’ radicals and ’hangers-on’. Avoid doomsday scenarios (Muslim radicals often overestimate their power). Do not paint the other party as ’the enemy’ as that helps them mobilize forces, direct action only against the ’hard core’. Work away from the limelight. Break away from polarizing slogans.

(d) limit accommodating dawa groups – realize that most Muslims are moderate and are bothered by the dawa groups. Refrain from seeking advice from these groups. Prevent one group or person from taking over contact with the government, seek diversity and keep in mind that some religious representatives might have double agendas. Refrain from (financially) supporting projects which discriminate between sexes etc. Do not support any initiatives or project which exclude other groups.

(e) start dialog with as many Muslim groups as possible – involve not only with liberal but also non-radcial, orthodox Muslims in the debate about social activities and the values of society, democracy and pluralistic society. Be alert that dawa groups often use ’facade-politics’ and do not support any project related to radical dawa mosques or centers.

(f) try to reinforce trust in the democratic order – support initiatives within the Muslim community that serve as a moderate counterweight to radicalism. Try to build up renewed public trust in the buoyancy of the democratic state and open society.

“More radical Dutch Muslims: report”

Radicalization in the West

The NYPD’s understanding of the threat from Islamic-based terrorism to New York City has evolved since September 11, 2001. While the threat from overseas remains, terrorist attacks or thwarted plots against cities in Europe, Australia and Canada since 2001 fit a different paradigm. Rather than being directed from al-Qaeda abroad, these plots have been conceptualized and planned by “unremarkable” local residents/citizens who sought to attack their country of residence, utilizing al-Qaeda as their inspiration and ideological reference point.

Some of these cases include:

  • Madrid’s March 2004 attack
  • Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group
  • London’s July 2005 attack
  • Australia’s Operation Pendennis (which thwarted an attack(s) in November 2005)
  • The Toronto 18 Case (which thwarted an attack in June 2006)

Where once we would have defined the initial indicator of the threat at the point where a terrorist or group of terrorists would actually plan an attack, we have now shifted our focus to a much earlier point-a point where we believe the potential terrorist or group of terrorists begin and progress through a process of radicalization. The culmination of this process is a terrorist attack.

Understanding this trend and the radicalization process in the West that drives “unremarkable” people to become terrorists is vital for developing effective counter- strategies and has special importance for the NYPD and the City of New York. As one of the country’s iconic symbols and the target of numerous terrorist plots since the 1990’s, New York City continues to be among the top targets of terrorists worldwide.

In order to test whether the same framework for understanding radicalization abroad applied within the United States, we analyzed three U.S. homegrown terrorism cases and two New York City based cases:

  • • Lackawana, New York
  • Portland, Oregon
  • Northern Virginia
  • New York City – Herald Square Subway
  • New York City – The Al Muhajiroun Two

The same radicalization framework was applied to a study of the origins of the Hamburg cluster of individuals, who led the September 11 hijackers. This assessment, almost six years after 2001, provides some new insights, previously not fully-grasped by the law enforcement and intelligence community, into the origins of this devastating attack.

The Radicalization of Diasporas and Terrorism: A Joint Conference

Certain Diaspora communities, frustrated by a perceived war against the Muslim world, have turned against their adopted homelands, targeting the government and its people by supporting terrorist attacks against Western countries through recruitment, fundraising, and training. The problem is exacerbated by the open borders of globalization. Emerging threats must be identified without alienating Diaspora communities and thereby playing into terrorist hands.

Analysis: The Dutch Cover Their Faces Before The Radicalization Of Islam

Before leaving the Netherlands for the United States last summer, Ayaan Hirsi Ali said: “I am leaving, but the questions about the future of Islam in our country remain.” With the exile of the Somali congresswoman, the combat against Muslim integrationists escalated, and the polemic over Islam and integration seems to be stomped out in this country. After the 2002 assassination of populist Pim Fortuyn, who described Islam as a “backwards culture”, and the 2004 assassination (by an islamist) of Theo Van Gogh, people no longer dare to publicly combat islamism. {(continued below in French)} Ayaan Hirsi Ali, avant de quitter les Pays-Bas, l’_t_ dernier, pour les _tats-Unis avait lanc_ : _ Je pars, mais les questions sur l’avenir de l’islam dans notre pays demeurent. _ Pourtant, avec l’exil de l’ancienne parlementaire d’origine somalienne, _g_rie du combat contre les int_gristes musulmans, les pol_miques sur l’islam et l’int_gration semblent s’_tre estomp_es dans ce pays. Apr_s l’assassinat, en 2002, du populiste Pim Fortuyn, qui qualifiait l’islam de _ culture arri_r_e _, puis celui, en 2004, du cin_aste Th_o Van Gogh par un islamiste, plus personne n’ose mener de combat public contre l’islamisme. L’immigration, l’_chec du multiculturalisme et les tensions intercommunautaires ont _t_ largement absents de la campagne _lectorale des l_gislatives de fin novembre. Il y a d_sormais consensus des principaux partis politiques pour mettre un frein _ l’immigration. Les lois tr_s strictes mises en place ces derniers mois par le ministre de l’Int_gration, Rita Verdonk, ne sont pas remises en cause. Mais dans la soci_t_ n_erlandaise, l’inqui_tude est toujours sensible. Selon une _tude publi_e l’_t_ dernier, 63 % des N_erlandais pensent, comme Ayaan Hirsi Ali, que _ l’islam est incompatible avec les valeurs occidentales _. Et la moiti_ d’entre eux affirment _ craindre ___l’islam et son influence sur la soci_t_ n_erlandaise _. Le relatif succ_s du nouveau Parti de la libert_ (9 si_ges), cr?_ par Geert Wilders, un ancien lib_ral qui veut _ arr_ter l’islamisation des Pays-Bas _, refl_te ce malaise. Mais alors que plusieurs groupes terroristes viennent d’_tre d_mantel_s, que les _ crimes d’honneur _ font une victime chaque mois dans le pays et qu’une r_cente _tude met en _vidence le risque d’une progression de l’islam radical aux Pays-Bas, c’est encore la _gedoogcultuur, cette culture de la tol_rance pouss_e jusqu’_ la permissivit_, qui pr_vaut. _ Le sentiment l_gitime de culpabilit_ issu du colonialisme, du racisme, de l’apartheid et de l’Holocauste a engendr_ une attention exclusive et particuli_re envers les ethnies et les cultures des communaut_s minoritaires, diabolisant au passage celles de la majorit_ autochtone _, explique _Ren_ Cuperus, membre du think-tank du parti travailliste PvdA. _ Rotterdam, les travaillistes, majoritaires au conseil municipal, viennent d’approuver un projet controvers_ : la construction du premier h_pital islamique d’Europe. Avec des d_partements s_par_s pour hommes et femmes. _ Utrecht, la commission pour l’_galit_ des chances vient de donner raison _ une jeune musulmane, professeur d’_conomie, qui refusait de serrer la main des hommes. Le coll_ge qui voulait la renvoyer a _t_ qualifi_ de _ trop ethnocentrique _. Par ailleurs, l’une des principales banques n_erlandaises, Rabobank, _tudie la possibilit_ de proposer des _ pr_ts halal _, sans int_r_ts, afin de satisfaire aux pr_ceptes de l’islam. Une institution financi_re islamique, Bila Riba (_ sans int_r_ts _ en arabe), a _t_ cr?_e il y a quelques mois _ Leiden. Enfin, pour refl_ter _ l’_volution de la soci_t_ _, un syndicat chr_tien propose de remplacer un jour f_ri_ chr_tien par un jour f_ri_ musulman… _ Pourquoi construire cet h_pital islamique alors que les _tablissements existants proposent d_j_, depuis longtemps, nourriture halal et lieux de pri_re ?, s’_tonne Rasit Bal, directeur de l’ISBO, l’organisation qui chapeaute les quarante-sept _coles islamiques du pays. Pourquoi imaginer des pr_ts sans int_r_ts alors qu’ailleurs en Europe les musulmans se satisfont des syst_mes bancaires occidentaux ? _ Dans un livre paru en septembre, l’ancien ministre de la Justice, le chr_tien-d_mocrate Piet Hein Donner, va plus loin : _ Le ton du d_bat politique ne me pla_t pas, affirme-t-il. _Tu t’assimileras, tu adopteras nos normes et nos valeurs, sois raisonnable, fais comme nous.* Ce n’est pas comme cela que j’envisage les choses. _ Et dans un _lan, semble-t-il, de bonne volont_ envers les musulmans, il assure que _ si les deux tiers des N_erlandais voulaient introduire la charia, ce serait scandaleux de dire : c’est impossible. C’est la majorit_ qui compte, voil_ l’essence de la d_mocratie _… Des propos qui ont suscit_ un toll_, mais qui t_moignent du profond d_sarroi de la classe politique locale envers l’islam. Le premier vote, le 30 novembre, du nouveau Parlement – o_ l’extr_me gauche est entr_e en force – a _t_ l’amnistie g_n_rale pour les quelque 26 000 d_bout_s du droit d’asile, entr_s au Pays-Bas avant avril 2001. Au m_me moment, une p_tition s’organisait contre le projet du gouvernement sortant d’interdire le port de la burqa… Pourtant, les N_erlandais continuent de remettre en cause le mod_le multiculturel: ils sont 70 % _ penser que les minorit_s doivent s’adapter _ leur culture. Les _tudes montrent que le sentiment x_nophobe appara_t surtout dans les grandes villes, chez les femmes et les homosexuels, inquiets de l’intol_rance des musulmans. _ L’id_e de soci_t_ multiculturelle est peut-_tre s_duisante aux yeux des immigrants, mais il n’emp_che qu’elle a fait beaucoup de d_g_ts, _affirme Ren_ Cuperus. Au lieu de contribuer _ faire accepter l’immigration, le concept de soci_t_ multiculturelle alimente dangereusement le ressentiment et la x_nophobie des autochtones, allant jusqu’_ sugg_rer que ces derniers ne sont ni plus ni moins qu’une minorit_ parmi les minorit_s. _ L’Am_ricain Francis Fukuyama, observateur attentif du syst_me multiculturel outre-Atlantique, met lui aussi en garde : _ Je consid_re que les Europ_ens, notamment les N_erlandais, font la politique de l’autruche. J’ai la conviction que le concept de soci_t_ multiculturelle est une _norme erreur. Cela n’a pas donn_ naissance _ une soci_t_ lib_rale, mais _ une s_rie de groupes qui ne se parlent pas. _ mon avis, on ne peut pas appeler cela une nation. _

Minister Backs New Muslim Group

{The government has backed a new body for Muslims which says not enough has been done to tackle extremism}. By Dominic Casciani LONDON – Politicians from the main parties welcomed the launch of the Sufi Muslim Council at Westminster in London. The group’s leaders say that it represents a silent majority frustrated with slow progress since the London bombings in July last year. The move is being seen as a direct challenge to the leadership of Muslim communities in the UK. The new organisation seeks to represent Sufi Muslims, a form of Islam which claims to cut across nationalities and ethnicities by focusing on purity of thought and deed. Its leaders say this approach differs from a politicised presentation of Islam that presents Muslims as separate to other people, something considered to be a key element in radicalisation and extremism. It is one of two major groups to have emerged since the London bombings offering different views to the dominant Muslim Council of Britain. Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for communities, attended the launch, saying that her department welcomed the new body saying she wanted to work with a broad range of groups. “We need to always ask ourselves whether we are working with the right groups in the right way,” she said. “Organisations such as the Sufi Muslim Council are an important part of that work … I welcome the council’s core principles condemning terrorism in all its forms and its partnership approach to taking forward joint initiatives and activities.” Radicalization Crucially, the Westminster launch also included Conservative and Liberal Democrat politicians, along with Anglicans and members of the Jewish community. Haras Rafiq, co-founder of the council, said the SMC had already formed a partnership with the British Muslim Forum (BMF), an organisation emerging as the representative of 300 mosques in the Midlands and northern England. The BMF was recently at the centre of a deal that brought competing Muslim bodies together to develop a watchdog for standards in mosques. ‘Silent majority’ Mr Rafiq said: “The prime minister and others have on many occasions rightly called for moderate Muslims to stand up and be counted. “In response to this call, and following extensive consultations within the Muslim community, we have decided to establish the Sufi Muslim Council.” He added: “Sufis count among the vast silent majority of Britain’s two million strong Muslim community. “Up to now they have lacked an externally visible voice and the intent of forming this council is to provide just such a strong voice.” Mr Rafiq said the council would immediately seek to build alliances both inside and outside of the community “to combat the evil political ideology” caused by a vacuum of leadership. He said: “There is an urgent need for the British Muslim community to engage in an internal debate to isolate the ideologies who falsely claim to represent Islam, to develop a strong field of moderate, intellectually astute, forward-thinking leaders and scholars who can promote the moderate values of civic society, engagement and diversity which characterize classical Islam.” ‘Groundwork needed’ The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) remains the largest community body in the UK, saying its dealings with ministers speak on behalf of hundreds of affiliated groups. But some Muslim figures, particularly among younger people in the large communities outside of London, believe that the MCB has not done enough to both combat extremism or to help tackle critical issues such as education and deprivation. But Inayat Bunglawala, spokesman for the Muslim Council of Britain, said that he doubted a new body could be launched with a press release and some political support in Parliament. “The key factor is the support in the wider Muslim community,” said Mr Bunglawala. “When we launched the MCB in 1997, it was only after three years of groundwork and careful consultations. The Muslim community is extremely diverse and we have worked hard to reflect that diversity, rather than seeking to represent just one strand of opinion. “It’s true that the MCB has had its critics, particularly the Board of Deputies of British Jews. But that is because we do not hide the concern of Muslims [over Israel and the Palestinians]. “The signals from the SMC talk of a so-called politicised Islam – well young Muslims are living an Islam which is quest for justice.”